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CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: INCREASED
ACCESS AND NARROWED ENFORCEMENT
Courtney Cross*
INTRODUCTION
The statute governing civil protection orders in the District of
Columbia is the Intrafamily Offenses Act,1 which has been in effect
since 1970.2 This statute has been amended frequently over the past 45
years. While some of these changes have been clerical
3 or procedural,4
there have also been substantive amendments which, inter alia,
significantly expand both who may file for a protection order and what
remedies that petitioner may request and receive. Yet this expansion
has coincided with an intense scaling back by the judiciary of who can
prosecute alleged violations of protection orders. While the statute
continues to enable more individuals to seek civil protection orders
with increasingly expansive remedies, the courts are proscribing those
victims' abilities to have their orders enforced.
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D.C. CODE §§ 16-1001-06 (2013).
2 District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, 91 Pub. L. No. 91-
358, 84 Stat. 473, 545 (1970) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE §§ 16-1001-06
(2013)).
3 See, e.g., Technical Amendments Act of 2003, D.C. Law 15-105 (2004);
Technical Amendments Act of 2008, D.C. Law 17-353 (2008) (renumbering
subsections of the Intrafamily Offenses Act).
4 See, e.g., Domestic Violence Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. Law 16-204
(2007) (clarifying the length of temporary protection orders that expire on days when
the court is closed).
I. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CHANGES TO THE INTRAFAMILY
OFFENSES ACT
During the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century, the
Intrafamily Offenses Act was amended nine times. Many of these
amendments expanded who could file for a protection order and what
remedies may be included in a protection order. Eligibility to petition
for a civil protection order was expanded with the Omnibus Public
Safety Act of 2006 to include domestic partners, individuals being
stalked by respondents with whom they had no other relationship, and
individuals being victimized by respondents with whom they at any
time shared a common romantic partner.5 Previously, eligibility had
been limited to individuals filing against respondents to whom they
were related by blood, legal custody, marriage, with whom they had a
child in common, or with whom they had at any time either shared a
romantic relationship or shared a residence.
6
In the Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008, the D.C. Council again
expanded who may file for a civil protection order to "any person who
alleges, or for whom is alleged, that he or she is the victim of
interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence, stalking, sexual
assault, or sexual abuse." 7 The terms "interpersonal violence,"
"intimate partner violence," and "intrafamily violence" were defined
in the statute to include all the relationships previously included as
well as being related by adoption and being or having been in a strictly
sexual relationship. In addition to the earlier addition of stalking, these
amendments also added being the victim of sexual assault and sexual
abuse to the list of individuals able to file for a civil protection order,
regardless of whether any other relationship existed outside of the
sexual offense.
The Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008 also explicitly outlined how
minors may access the civil protection order system. 8 These
amendments made clear that victims of intrafamily or interpersonal
violence may file for a civil protection order on their own at age 16 or
older, while victims of intimate partner violence may independently
file for a protection order at age 12 or older.9 Minors falling outside of
these categories must have a parent, custodian, or guardian file for a
5 Omnibus Public Safety Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. Law 16-306 (2007).
6 D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5) (1995).
7 Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008, D.C. Law 17-368 (2008).
8 Id.
9 Id.
civil protection order on their behalf. 10 This Act also included
requirements for serving minor respondents' parents, custodians, or
guardians as well as other procedures when either or both of the parties
are minors.'
The Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008 also amended the section of
the statute enumerating remedies available to petitioners by first
revising the language of the existing provisions and also by stating that
the trial court may "direct[] the care, custody, or control of a domestic
animal in the household."12 This language was expanded slightly by
the Criminal Code Amendment Act of 2010, which included domestic
animals belonging to the petitioner or the respondent, or living in their
household. 
13
II. SHIFTING CRIMINAL CONTEMPT JURISPRUDENCE
Although there were multiple amendments within the Intrafamily
Offenses Act of 2008 that clarify the role of the attorney general and
the United States Attorney's Office related to obtaining civil
protection orders,14 very few substantive changes have been made to
the statute regarding enforcement of protection orders through the
criminal contempt process. The Uniform Interstate Enforcement of
Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act of 2002 established that a
violation in the District of a valid foreign protection order, like a civil
protection order, is chargeable as contempt or as a separate
misdemeanor; that any communication made from someone outside of
the District to someone inside of the District is considered to be made
within the District in order to establish a protection order violation;
and that a violation of a consent without admission protection order is
punishable by a contempt proceeding or by a separate misdemeanor
prosecution.15 The Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008 only amended the
statute pertaining to contempt by specifying the controlling chapter of
the D.C. Code when the alleged violator is a minor.16 The fines
associated with violation of protection orders through either a
contempt proceeding or a misdemeanor prosecution were amended to
10 Id. The amendments also lay out when parents or guardians may file for a
civil protection order on behalf of a minor.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Criminal Code Amendment Act of 2010, 58 D.C. Reg. 1174 (2011).
14 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-1002, 16-1003(b)-(c), 16-1005(a-1) (2013).
15 D.C. CODE § 16-1005(f)-(i) (2013).
16 D.C. CODE § 16-1005(g- 1) (2013).
be consistent with those provided in the Criminal Fine Proportionality
Amendment Act of 2012.17 Despite the D.C. Council making minor
revisions to the statute regarding contempt, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals has taken the lead on determining how this
mechanism for enforcement may be used.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' jurisprudence regarding how a victim of
domestic violence could enforce her civil protection order was well
settled. If an individual against whom a civil protection order had been
issued violated that order before it expired, the beneficiary of the
protection order could not only file a motion for contempt in the
Domestic Violence Unit of Superior Court but they could also
prosecute the contempt case themselves, with or without legal
representation. During this time, prosecutions for violating a civil
protection order could be conducted by the Office of the Attorney
General, the private attorney representing the protection order
beneficiary, or the beneficiary herself. It was not uncommon for a pro
se individual to conduct this proceeding, despite the fact that, if found
guilty, the defendant could be placed on probation, incarcerated, or
both. Even when the Office of the Attorney General served as the
prosecutor, it did so in the capacity of the beneficiary's attorney.
This process had been authorized by the court of appeals in the
1994 case Green v. Green. In Green, the court held that a defendant
in a protection order criminal contempt case had no constitutional right
to a public prosecutor. 19 The court of appeals found that the
Intrafamily Offenses Act reflected the D.C. Council's determination
that the beneficiary of a civil protection order should be able to pursue
and prosecute criminal contempt charges.2 0 Although the court of
appeals acknowledged that, in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils S.A., the United States Supreme Court had previously held that
attorneys representing a beneficiary of a court order could not be
appointed to prosecute a violation of that order,21 the court of appeals
both distinguished the facts in Green from those in Young and noted
that it was not bound by an opinion issued by the Supreme Court
17 D.C. CODE § 16-1005(f)-(g) (2013).
18 Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275 (D.C. 1994).
'9 Id. at 1281.
20 Id. at 1279.
21 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809
(1987).
pursuant to its supervisory authority.22 Survivors of domestic violence
were thus able to directly seek enforcement of their civil protection
orders in D.C. Superior Court through privately prosecuted criminal
contempt proceedings.
In 2000, the court of appeals decided In re Peak, in which it
adopted the holdings in Young in the context of a criminal contempt
proceeding of a non-domestic violence civil restraining order.2 3 Peak
specifically recognized that contempt of civil protection orders fell
outside of its holding24 and the practice of domestic violence survivors
privately prosecuting violations of their civil protection orders
continued throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century.
In 2008, the court returned to this question in In re Robertson
(Robertson 1), where it affirmed the constitutionality of a contempt
prosecution by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), despite the
OAG having directly represented the survivor in her underlying civil
25protection order hearing. The court of appeals held that, pursuant to
the Intrafamily Offenses Act, contempt prosecutions for violations of
protection orders were actually brought in the name of the private
individuals who sought to enforce their orders.26 Because the court of
appeals found that these cases did not constitute public actions but
rather private actions seeking enforcement of court orders, the court
found that the practice of private prosecutions in the domestic violence
context did not run afoul of any prohibition against private
prosecutions.27 As such, the court of appeals was also able to find that
the private prosecutor in this case was not bound to an earlier plea
agreement prohibiting the United States from pursuing charges against
the defendant based on the actions that constituted the protection order
28violation.
22 Green, 642 A.2d at 1278.
23 In re Peak, 759 A.2d 612 (D.C. 2000).
24 See id. at 620 (concluding that "except under the special circumstances
presented in Green, or in some other unusual situation, the court may not appoint
counsel for a party who benefits from a court order to prosecute a criminal contempt
proceeding arising from alleged noncompliance with that order."). The court went on
to note that its decision "casts no doubt on the propriety of the contempt procedures
authorized in that context by the Superior Court's Intra-Family rules." Id. at 620 n.
16 (citation omitted).
25 In re Robertson, 940 A.2d 1050 (D.C. 2008).
26 Id. at 1058.
27 Id. at 1057-58.
28 Id. at 1059-60.
Appellant John Robertson petitioned this decision to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted a writ of certiorari limited to the
question of whether a private individual can, in their own name,
prosecute an action for contempt.29 The Supreme Court then dismissed
the writ as improvidently granted after hearing oral arguments.
30
Despite this dismissal, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a strongly
worded dissent arguing that the case should have been decided by the
Court and that the answer to the question posed by the case must be31
no. In his dissent, joined by three other justices, Chief Justice
Roberts vehemently discredits the court of appeals' holdings that civil
protection order contempt cases do not constitute criminal cases and
that they may be brought by private individuals rather than pursuant to
the power of the government.32
Despite a majority of the Supreme Court deciding not to reach a
decision in the case, the panel of judges on the D.C. Court of Appeals
that had initially decided Robertson I decided en banc to amend the
decision. In Robertson H, the court held that contempt cases for
violations of civil protection orders cannot be brought in the name of a
private individual and must instead be brought in the name of the
United States.33 The court of appeals also held, however, that pursuant
to the intrafamily offenses statutory framework, the prosecution in
Robertson was actually brought in the name of the sovereign despite
the victim's attorneys acting as the prosecution.34 Where Robertson I
sidestepped Young's ambit by declaring intrafamily contempt
proceedings as private matters, Robertson H cites to dicta in Young to
recast these contempt proceedings as exercises of trial court judges'
authority to enforce their orders.35 Rather than overturning Green,
however, the court in Robertson H relied specifically on language in
Green when discussing the statutory framework underpinning
contempt proceedings in civil protection order cases-as in Green, the
court of appeals underscored the D.C. Council's determination that
29 Robertson v. U.S., ex rel. Watson, 558 U.S. 1090 (2009).
30 Robertson v. U.S., ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272 (2010).
31 Id. at 273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he terrifying force of
the criminal justice system may only be brought to bear against an individual by
society as a whole, through a prosecution brought on behalf of the government.").
32 Id. at 275-81.
33 In re Robertson, 19 A.3d 751, 755 (D.C. 2011).
34 Id. at 755-56.
35 Id. at 761.
survivors of violence should be able to enforce their civil protection
orders through a contempt proceeding.
36
Robertson H evinces the tension between the court of appeals'
acceptance of legislative history and policy arguments in favor of
broad enforcement for civil protection orders and its recognition that
criminal contempt proceedings cannot be categorized as private
proceedings. The court's new focus on criminal contempt proceedings
as a vindication of judges' authority enabled the court to acknowledge
the involvement of sovereign power in these cases, even though this
power stemmed from the judicial rather than the executive branch.
The Robertson H decision was met with a great deal of confusion
at the trial court level. Defense counsel flooded the court with motions
to dismiss open contempt cases that were being privately prosecuted
and survivors' ability to enforce their own orders depended heavily on
which judge happened to hear the case. Some judges continued to
allow private people to prosecute contempt of civil protection orders in
the name of the United States, while others insisted that these cases
must be prosecuted by either the Office of the Attorney General or the
United States Attorney's Office, the latter of which prosecutes the vast
majority of criminal cases in the District of Columbia.
A month after the Robertson H decision came out, the court of
appeals amended its decision in another civil protection order
contempt case: In re Shirley.37 Shirley posed two questions: whether
the trial court had jurisdiction to hold the defendant in contempt and
whether consent by the beneficiary of the civil protection order
effectively constituted a defense for violations thereof.38 The court of
appeals affirmed the criminal contempt conviction and held that
consent is not a defense to a protection order violation.39 The court
relied on the language in Robertson II concerning the involvement of
the sovereign and the authority of a court to enforce its order to refute
the appellant's claim that, because the holder of a protection order had
a private right to enforce their order, they also had the ability to
modify or vacate their order privately.4 ° In its discussion of the trial
court's authority in the civil protection order criminal contempt
36 Id. at 760.
37 In re Shirley, 28 A.3d 506 (D.C. 2011).
31 Id. at 507.
39 Id. at 513.
40 Id. at 511 (citing to both the fact that these cases must be brought pursuant to
the government's sovereign power and the nature of these cases as a function of the
court's authority to enforce its orders).
context, the court also noted that trial court judges may decide to hold
evidentiary hearings and determine whether an individual is in
contempt of a protection order even if the beneficiary of that order is
not asking the court to do so.41 In denying the appellant's claim that
protection orders can be both modified and enforced privately, the
court of appeals underscored the expansive authority granted to trial
court judges adjudicating protection order criminal contempt cases.
By 2012, the court of appeals began circumscribing this broad
articulation of authority. In response to two cases consolidated for
appeal in which a trial court judge, relying explicitly on Robertson II
and Shirley, prosecuted indirect criminal contempts of civil protection
orders himself, the court of appeals clarified how these cases may and
42may not proceed. In In re Jackson, the court not only held that a
judge may not act in the capacity of a prosecutor in a protection order
contempt case but also that a judge must both initially seek out a
public prosecutor and safeguard the due process rights of the defendant
in these cases.43 Regarding a public prosecutor, Jackson-citing Young
extensively-specifically noted that if neither the United States
Attorney's Office nor the Office the Attorney General decided to
prosecute a case, the judge may appoint a private prosecutor but that
prosecutor must be a disinterested representative of the United
States.44 The court specifically noted that a survivor's private attorney
should not be appointed to this role.45 In addition the right to a neutral
prosecutor, the court of appeals expressed the importance of the
defendant in protection order contempt cases being afforded other
elements of due process, including notice of the underlying violations,
an impartial judge, a lawyer, and the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses.46 Reiterating its focus on defendants' due
process rights in intrafamily contempt cases, shortly after Jackson the
court of appeals reversed a contempt conviction on the grounds that
the defendant did not have proper notice that his drug use could trigger
a contempt proceeding.47
In 2013, the court of appeals reversed a pre-Robertson H contempt
conviction in which the defendant was prosecuted by a pro se
41 Id. at 512 (citing Adams v. Ferreira, 741 A.2d 1046, 1047 (D.C. 1999)).
42 In re Jackson, 51 A.3d 529 (D.C. 2012).
41 Id. at 531.
44 Id. at 539.
45 Id. at 540.
46 Id. at 541.
47 In re Jones, 51 A.3d 1290 (D.C. 2012).
beneficiary of a protection order.48 In order to reverse the conviction in
In re Taylor, the court first found that the prosecution in this case was
so egregious that it satisfied the court's test for plain error.49 The court
found that this process violated both Robertson H's requirement that
the case be brought on behalf of the sovereign and Jackson's mandate
that the case be prosecuted by a disinterred attorney.50 Because the
prosecutor in Taylor was a pro se individual who received guidance
from the judge, the trial court judge also violated Jackson's prohibition
against active judicial involvement in the prosecution of criminal
defendants.5 1 Although the court noted that the decision to exercise its
discretion and reverse the conviction was specifically tied to the facts
in this case,52 such open-ended language refers only to whether the
court would reverse previously decided cases involving pro se private
prosecutions. The court of appeals' discussion of Robertson II and
Jackson leave no doubt that the era of pro se prosecutions and
prosecutions by interested counsel has ended.
CONCLUSION
At the trial court level, criminal contempt prosecutions for
violations of civil protection orders have become homogenized. While
a pro se individual can still file a motion for criminal contempt, the
trial court judge will immediately ascertain whether the Office of the
Attorney General or the United States Attorney's Office will prosecute
the contempt allegations. If either agency decides to pursue the
contempt charges, the case proceeds as a criminal matter. If both
agencies decline to prosecute (for substantive or discretionary reasons
or due to a conflict of interest),53 the trial court may then either dismiss
the contempt charges or appoint a special prosecutor. In the limited
48 In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85 (D.C. 2013).
49 Id. at 89-90.
50 Id. at 98.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 104.
53 It is worth underscoring that, while some decisions by government agencies
not to prosecute are based on the merits of the allegations, other decisions are made
based on considerations including conflicts of interest, available resources, and
challenges with investigating the claims. While a decision based on the merits of the
allegations after a thorough investigation does not require further review by a private
prosecutor, having more information about the nature of the government's decision
may aid a judge in determining whether to appoint a private prosecutor to investigate
criminal contempt allegations that have been denied by the government.
time since the contempt jurisprudence has resettled, trial court judges
have not yet begun to appoint private prosecutors to represent the
sovereign with any regularity. Although a local law firm has agreed to
accept appointments for private prosecutions in domestic violence
contempt proceedings,54 this resource is not consistently utilized-
rather, judges are often dismissing contempt allegations once
government agencies have opted not to prosecute. Some survivors are
left unable to enforce their civil protection orders.
As the D.C. Council has continued to make the civil protection
order increasingly accessible and far-reaching, the courts have
witnessed an influx of both petitioners seeking protection orders and
beneficiaries of orders seeking enforcement. Rather than mirror the
D.C. Council's expansive approach to providing access to the
protection order system, the court of appeals has taken a limiting
approach in determining how violations of these orders may be
prosecuted. While the trial court is exploring solutions to this
mismatch, some survivors whose protection orders have been violated
are unable to have their orders enforced and their abusive partners
remain unaccountable.
54 Jose L6pez, Associate Judge, D.C. Superior Court, Domestic Violence
Division, District of Columbia Bench Bar Dialogue (June 10, 2014) (stating that a
private law firm has been trained to accept private prosecution appointments).
